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TOWARD A PRACTICAL ESTATE-TAX EXCLUSION
FOR FAMILY-RUN BUSINESSES: ANALYSIS OF
SECTION 2033A AND PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
Eric D. Chason"'
Robert T. Danforth"'"'

Editors' Synopsis: In a previous work appearing in this Journal, the
authors proposed an approach to estate and gift taxation that encourages productive behavior by the recipients of wealth. In this Article, the
authors analyze, in the context of their earlier work, the new estate-tax
exclusion for closely held businesses (section 2033A) created by the
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997. The authors describe the features of a
practical family-run business exclusion and conclude that section
2033A, in its present fonn, fails as a practical exclusion. The authors
catalogue those elements of section 2033A that should be retained and
propose reforms of those elements that should be eliminated or changed.
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Summary

V. TOWARD A PRACTICAL FAMILY-RUN BUSINESS EXCLUSION
A. Introduction
B. The Liquidity and Concentration-of-Ownership Tests
C. Passive Assets and the Trade or Business Requirement
D. The Size of the Exclusion
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F. Material Participation
1. Participation After Decedent's Death
2. Participation Before Decedent's Death
G. Application to Gifts
H. Income Tax Basis of Excluded Property
I. Summary
VI. CONCLUSION AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM

I. INTRODUCTION
In an earlier work, we analyzed the estate and gift taxation of closely
held businesses. 1 In that article, we proposed that encouraging the work
efforts of beneficiaries may be a justification for the estate and gift tax.
Narrowing our focus to closely held businesses, we argued that this
justification fails when beneficiaries work in family-run businesses.
Thus, we concluded, the estate and gift tax should apply differently to

1

Eric D. Chason & Robert T. Danforth. The Proper Role of the Estate and Gift
Taxation of Closely Held Businesses, 32 REAL PROP. PROB. & TRUST J. 103 (1997).
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interests in such businesses. 2
In August of 1997, as part of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 ( "TRA
1997"),3 Congress changed the estate (but not gift) 4 taxation of closely
held businesses. Section 2033A5 of the Internal Revenue Code (the
"Code") creates an exclusion for qualified family-owned business
interests. Through the combined effects of the section 2033A exclusion
and the section 2010 unified credit, 6 qualifying estates may now pass up
to $1,300,000 in qualified family-owned business interests and other
assets without payment of estate tax.
In this Article, we analyze section 2033A in the context of our
previous work. Part II of this Article summarizes section 2033A7 and
other elements of TRA 1997 that concern the taxation of closely held
businesses. Part III summarizes our previous work. Part IV extends this
work by describing how a practical exclusion for family-run businesses
would operate. Part V analyzes section 2033A and concludes that, in its
present form, it fails as a practical exclusion. Part V identifies those
elements of section 2033A that should be retained and suggests a reform
of those elements that should be eliminated or changed. Part VI
summarizes our findings and reform proposals.

2

For a more complete summary of our previous article, see infra Part III.
Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788 (1997) [hereinafter TRA 1997].
4
Cf infra Section V .G (arguing that an exclusion for family-run businesses should
not apply to gifts).
5
For ease of citation, this article refers to TRA 1997 § 502(a), 111 Stat. 847 (1997)
(codified at I.R.C. § 2033A) as section 2033A or I.R.C. § 2033A.
6
I.R.C. § 2010 (1994), amended by TRA 1997 § 501(a).
7
Any summary of section 2033A is by necessity an over-simplification. It is one of
the longest and most complicated of the estate tax provisions and contains numerous and
sometimes inscrutable cross-references. Its complexity alone is a sufficient basis to call
for its reform. See infra note 66 and accompanying text (observing that complexity makes
planning difficult and increases the costs of compliance). Several of our reform proposals
would significantly simplify the statute. See, e.g. , infra Section V.B (advocating repeal
of the 50% liquidity test).
3
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II. CLOSELY HELD BUSINESS PROVISIONS UNDER
THE TAXPAYER RELIEF ACT OF 1997

A. The New Family-Owned Business Exclusion
1. The Exclusion
For decedents dying after December 31, 1997, section 2033A
provides a "family-owned business exclusion" from the estate tax.
Section 2033A potentially excludes from the decedent's gross estate value
representing the decedent's interest in a "qualified family-owned
business" (" QFOB "). The maximum exclusion equals the lesser of ( 1) the
"adjusted value of the qualified family-owned business interests of the
decedent otherwise includible in the estate" 8 or (2) $1,300,000 less the
applicable exclusion amount. 9 For decedents dying in 1998, the
maximum QFOB exclusion will be $675,000, because the applicable
exclusion will be $625,000. 10 This maximum exclusion will decline in the
years following 1998 as the applicable exclusion amount grows from
$625,000 to $1 ,000,000 by 2006. 11 · Thus, the maximum QFOB exclusion
for decedents dying in 2006 and thereafter will be $300,000.

2. Qualified Family-Owned Business
A QFOB must be a trade or business. Section 2033A does not define
"trade or business," but the regulations under Code section 2032A

8

I.R.C. § 2033A(a)(l). For discussions of the "adjusted value" limitation, see infra
notes 29-34 and accompanying text and Section V.E.
9
I.R.C. § 2033A(a)(2). Section 50l(a) of TRA 97 amended section 2010 by
changing the present $600,000 estate-tax exemption equivalent to the "applicable exclusion
amount," which is increased incrementally from $600,000 to a maximum of $1,000,000
for estates of decedents dying and gifts made during 2006 or later years. See generally
Chason & Danforth, supra note 1, at 108 (discussing the $600,000 exemption equivalent
before TRA 1997).
10
See I.R.C. § 2010(c)(l997).
11

See id.
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elaborate on the meaning of the term. 12 Those regulations describe a
trade or business as an active business such as a manufacturing,
mercantile, or service enterprise, or . . . the raising of agricultural or
horticultural commodities, as distinguished from passive investment
activities. 13 Passive investment activities, such as renting real property,
do not qualify as a trade or business. 14
II

II

The interest in the trade or business may be either a sole proprietorship or an interest in an entity in which the decedent's family 1s holds a
sufficient percentage of the ownership interests. In general, the family
ownership requirement for an entity 16 is satisfied if the decedent's family
owns fifty percent of the entity. Thirty-percent ownership by the
decedent's family is sufficient if two families (including the decedent's
family) own seventy percent, or three families own ninety percent, of the
entity. Subject to several exclusions and limitations, an interest in a trade
or business satisfying these ownership requirements is a QFOB interest.

12

Although section 2033A does not expressly incorporate the section 2032A
definition of a trade or business, the similarity between section 2033A and section 2032A
invites analogy. Section 2032A permits an estate to value certain real property used for
farming or in a trade or business at its use value, rather than at its fair market value
(which would be based on highest and best use, as opposed to actual use). See Chason &
Danforth, supra note l, at lll-12. Section 2033A permits an exclusion rather than a
valuation reduction; nevertheless, sections 2032A and 2033A are structurally similar, and
section 2033A even defines several terms and concepts by reference to section 2032A.
See, e.g., I.R.C. § 2033A(i); see also infra notes 40-44 and accompanying text
(discussing the section 2032A material-participation test, which is incorporated into section
2033A by reference).
13
Treas. Reg. § 20.2032A-3(b)(l)(l997).
14
/d. In addition, the presence of an office with regular hours is insufficient to
constitute a trade or business under section 2032A. /d. Furthermore, no activity not
engaged in for profit is a trade or business under section 2032A. /d.
iS By decedent's "family," we mean to include the decedent.
Cf. I.R.C. §
2033A(i)(2) (defining "member of the family" by reference to section 2032A(e)(2)).
16
Determining the percentage ownership in an entity is not a simple matter under
section 2033A. Ownership in a corporation must be in both voting power and total
ownership in the corporation. I.R.C. § 2033A(e)(3)(A)(i). Ownership in a partnership
must be in the capital interest in the partnership. I.R.C. § 2033A(e)(3)(A)(ii). Ownership
in tiered entities presents additional complications. The Code looks through each entity to
determine whether every underlying trade or business satisfies the definition of a QFOB.
I.R.C. § 2033A(e)(3)(B).
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Section 2033A imposes several significant limitations on the definition
of a QFOB. First, the principal place of business must be in the United
States. 17 Second, the stock or debt of the entity (or a controlled group
that includes the entity) must not have been publicly traded anytime within
three years of the decedent's death.I 8
Two other limitations curtail the use of section 2033A in transferring
passive assets. In general, the entity may have no more than thirty-five
percent of its adjusted ordinary income be personal holding company
income for the year of the decedent's death. 19 Personal holding company
income typically means passive income such as dividends, interest,
royalties, and rents. 20 Moreover, the value of the QFOB is reduced by
the value of cash and marketable securities in excess of the needs for dayto-day working capitaF1 and by the value of other assets producing
personal holding company income22 and foreign personal holding
company income. 23 Thus, a QFOB interest may have no more than thirtyfive percent of its income from passive assets, and, after accounting for
working-capital needs, the value of passive assets reduces the value of the
QFOB interest.

17

I.R.C. § 2033A(e)(2)(A).
I.R.C. § 2033A(e)(2)(8).
19
I.R.C. § 2033A(e)(2)(C).
20
See generally I.R.C. § 543(a)(1994) (defining personal holding company income}.
Personal holding company income also includes amounts received under personal service
contracts and income from trusts and estates.
21
The Conference Report indicates that day-to-day working capital is the historical
average of the business's working capital needs. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 105-220, at 379
(1997) (citing Bardahl Mfg. Corp v. Commissioner, 24 T.C .M. 1030 (1965)}.
Accumulations for acquisitions are not part of day-to-day working capital. /d.
22
See supra note 20 and accompanying text (describing personal holding company
income).
23
See I. R. C. § 954(c )(1 )(1994), amended by TRA 1997 § 1051. The relevant
foreign personal holding company income is (1) net gain from the sale of an interest in a
trust, partnership, REMIC, or property that produces no income, (2) net gain from
commodities transactions, (3) net gain from currency transactions, (4) income equivalent
to interest, (5) income from notional principal contracts, and (6) payments in lieu of
dividends.
18
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3. Qualifying Estates
Not all estates containing QFOB interests are entitled to the exclusion.
In order to avail itself of the exclusion, the estate (as opposed to the
business) must satisfy four other tests. First, the decedent must be a
United States citizen or resident. 24 Second, the executor must make an
election and file an agreement to pay future taxes. 25 Third, during at least
five of the eight years before the decedent's death, the decedent or the
decedent's family must have both owned the business interests and
materially participated in the operation of the business. 26 Fourth, the
value of the QFOB interests passing to qualified heirs27 at death or by gift
must, roughly speaking, exceed fifty percent of the decedent's gross
estate. 28
The fifty-percent test is perhaps the most complex portion of this
highly complicated statute. 29 Essentially, the fifty-percent test requires
that the estate be somewhat illiquid. The test requires that the "adjusted
value of the qualified family-owned business" plus the "amount of gifts of
such interests exceed fifty percent of the adjusted gross estate. 30 Thus,
the numerator, which is the adjusted amount of the interests passing to
heirs, divided by the denominator, which is the adjusted gross estate,
must exceed fifty-percent.
II

II

II

The base amount of the numerator is the value of the QFOB interests

24

I.R.C. § 2033A(b)(l)(A).
I.R.C. § 2033A(b)(l)(B); see also I.R.C. § 2033A(h) (describing the agreement by
which each heir to the QFOB interests must agree to pay recapture taxes); infra Subsection
II.A.5 (discussing recapture provisions).
26
I.R.C. § 2033A(b)(l)(D).
27
A qualified heir is either a member of the decedent's family or an active employee
of the trade or business for 10 years prior to the decedent's death.
I.R.C.
§ 2033A(i)(l)(A)-(B). The "decedent' s family" includes any ancestor, spouse, lineal
descendant, or spouse of a lineal descendant. I.R.C. § 2033A(i)(l)(A).
28
I.R.C. § 2033A(b)(l)(C).
29
But cf. I.R.C. § 2033A(f)(l)(A) (imposing a recapture tax if within 10 years after
the decedent's death there is an 8-year period ending after the decedent's death during
which the decedent's family did not materially participate in the trade or business for
periods aggregating 3 or more years).
30
I.R.C. § 2033A(b)(l)(C).
25
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that are in the gross estate and acquired by any qualified heir3 1 plus the
value of all gifts of the business that consumed part of the decedent's
unified credit or escaped gift tax under the annual exclusion. 32 This
amount is then adjusted for debts of the decedent. It is reduced by
deductions for all debts or mortgages under section 2053(a)(3) or (4), but
increased by debts related to a residence, debts related to medical or
educational purposes, and other debts that do not exceed $10,000. 33
Additionally, this amount is adjusted for certain inter vivos gifts of the
QFOB interests. It is reduced by the value of such gifts that the recipient
failed to hold continuously until the decedent's death, such gifts that the
decedent's spouse received, and such gifts that are included in the
decedent's gross estate. 34 This process yields the numerator for the fiftypercent test.
The base amount of the denominator is the value of the gross estate.
Section 2033A adds to this value the value of the gifts of the QFOB
interests (as previously determined), transfers of QFOB interests to the
decedent's spouse within ten years of death, and any other gifts of such
interests (other than annual exclusion gifts) to members of the decedent's
family within three years of death. 35 The provision reduces this amount
by the value of all such gifts that are included in the gross estate and any
deductions for debts or mortgages. 36 This process yields the denominator
for the fifty percent test.

31

I.R.C. § 2033A(b)(2).
For a discussion of the unified credit and annual exclusion, see Chason &
Danforth, supra note 1, at 108-09.
33
I.R.C. § 2033A(d).
34
Under section 2033A(b)(3)(A)(i), the starting point for determining the gifts
included in the numerator is "the amount of [gifts of QFOB interests] from the decedent
to members of the decedent's family [that are] taken into account under subsection
2001(b)(l)(B)." The latter provision concerns the decedent's "adjusted taxable gifts,"
which, by definition, excludes gifts that are includible in the decedent's gross estate.
I.R.C. § 2001(b)(1994) (flush language). Thus, the reduction of the numerator by gifts
includible in the decedent's estate as provided by section 2033A(b)(3)(B) is superfluous
and, consequently, makes an inappropriate adjustment to the numerator under section
2033A(b)(l)(C). This apparent defect in the statute is the subject of a recently proposed
technical correction. See H.R. 2645, 105th Cong. § 6(b)(2)(1997).
35
I.R.C. § 2033A(c)(2)(A).
36
I.R.C. § 2033A(c)(l).
32
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4. Amount of QFOB Exclusion
Section 2033A limits the amount of the QFOB exclusion to a
maximum of "the adjusted value of the qualified family-owned business
interests of the decedent otherwise includible in the estate. "37 As
discussed in greater detail below, 38 the "adjusted value" limitation reduces
the size of the maximum available QFOB exclusion by most claims
against the estate and debts of the estate that are deductible for estate tax
purposes under section 2053(a). As a result of this limitation, the full
value of the QFOB interests held by an estate may not be eligible for the
exclusion, notwithstanding that the total value of the QFOB interest is less
than the dollar limitation imposed by section 2033A(a)(2). 39

5. Recapture
The qualified heir who receives the QFOB interest must satisfy
certain material-participation requirements to avoid recapture of the estate
taxes attributable to the QFOB exclusion. 40 Section 2033A in general
requires material participation by the qualified heir until ten years after
the decedent's death. 41 The section 2033A material-participation test
triggers recapture if during any eight-year period ending after the
decedent's death, material participation fails to occur for periods
aggregating more than three years. 42 While a qualified heir holds the
property, the material-participation test is satisfied if either the heir or a
member of the heir's family materially participates. While the decedent
holds the property, the material-participation test is satisfied if either the
decedent or a member of the decedent's family materially participates. 43
I.R.c . § 2033A(a)(l).
See infra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
39
See supra Subsection II.A.1 (discussing the provisions of section 2033A that limit
the exclusion to $1,300,000 reduced by the section 2010(c) applicable exclusion amount).
40
For a discussion of the method for determining the amount of tax recaptured, see
infra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
41
I.R.C. § 2033A(f)(l). Material participation need not occur after the qualified
heir's death if the qualified heir dies before the 10-year period expires.
42
I.R.C. § 2033A(f)(l)(A) (referring to the material-participation requirements of
section 2032A(c)(6)(B)).
43
I.R.C. § 2033A(b)(l)(D).
37

38
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Failure to satisfy the material-participation test triggers the imposition
of additional estate tax plus interest-essentially a recapture of the taxes
attributable to the excluded QFOB property. 44 A disposition of the QFOB
property by the qualified heir during the ten-year period following the
decedent's death also triggers additional estate tax plus interest, unless the
disposition is to a member of the qualified heir's family or constitutes a
qualified conservation contribution under section 170(h).45 Recapture is
also triggered if the heir loses his or her United States citizenship or
moves the principal place of business outside the United States. 46
Section 2033A bases the additional estate tax on the "adjusted tax
difference attributable to the qualified family-owned business interest. "47
The statute does not defme this term but directs that the "adjusted tax
difference" is to be determined under principles similar to the rules of
section 2032A(c)(2)(B). 48 Applying these principles yields an adjusted tax
difference for purposes of recapture that would be a fraction of the estate
tax savings attributable to section 2033A. The Committee Report
indicates that the numerator of the fraction is the estate tax value of the
interest triggering recapture, and the denominator is the estate tax value
of all QFOB interests. 49 Upon a recapture event, the qualified heir owes
the adjusted tax difference plus interest. This amount, however, is phased
out incrementally between the sixth and tenth years after the decedent's
death. 5°

6. Summary
Section 2033A, along with the applicable exclusion amount under
section 2010(c), excludes from qualifying estates up to $1,300,000 of
value represented by a family-owned business. To qualify for the
exclusion, the business must satisfy one of two concentration-of-

44

I.R.C. § 2033A(t)(2).
I.R.C. § 2033A(t)(l)(B).
46
I.R.C. § 2033A(t)(l)(C)-(D).
47
I.R.C. § 2033A(t)(2)(A)(i).
48 /d.
49
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-220, at 399 (1997).
50
See id. at 400.
45
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ownership tests: the business must be owned ( 1) fifty percent by the
decedent's family or (2) thirty percent by the decedent's family, if
ownership is sufficiently concentrated in one or two other families.
Section 2033A either limits or denies the exclusion to businesses holding
excessive passive assets. The exclusion is further limited to the amount
of the QFOB interests reduced by certain estate tax deductible claims and
debts. Even if an estate holds QFOB interests, the estate must meet other
qualifications. In particular, the decedent or the decedent's family must
have materially participated in the business before the decedent's death,
and the interests must be roughly fifty percent of the estate. The heirs
must continue to participate in the trade or business for ten years after the
•
decedent's death.

B. Expansion of Estate-Tax Deferral
TRA 1997 substantially liberalized the interest payment rules of
section 6166.!11 Under prior law, a preferential four percent interest rate
applied to a portion of the taxes deferred under section 6166 equal to the
lesser of the total taxes deferred or the estate taxes attributable to the first
$1,000,000 of closely held business property.s2 Under most circumstances, the maximum amount of taxes to which the preferential rate
applied was $153,000, which represented the tax on $1,000,000, after
taking into account the unified credit under section 2010. Section 503(a)
of TRA 1997 changed the four percent rate to a two percent rate; the
preferential rate now applies to the first $1,000,000 of taxable closely
held business property. In other words, the two percent rate applies to
the tax on the first $1,000,000 of closely held business property in excess
of the amount sheltered by the unified credit and, if applicable, the QFOB
exclusion. Based on the unified credit applicable to decedents dying in
1998,s3 the maximum amount of tax to which the special rate applies is

Sl

TRA 1997 § 503. For an overview of section 6166, see Chason & Danforth,

supra note 1, at 112-15.
s2 I.R.C. § 6601(j)(2)(1994), amended by TRA 1997 § 503(a).
53

This calculation also reflects that the amount qualifying for the special interest rate
in 1998 is $1,000,000. The qualifying amount may be greater after 1998, because the
$1,000,000 figure is now indexed to inflation. See TRA 1997 § 501{e).
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$407,500. 54 The tradeoff for this more favorable rule is that interest
payable on deferred taxes under section 6166 is no longer deductible for
either income tax or estate tax purposes. 55 Assuming a marginal estate
tax rate of 55%, the non-deductibility rule reduces the benefit of the
favorable interest rate by a factor of 0.45, so that the new rate is roughly
equivalent to a deductible interest rate of 4.44%. 56 Assuming an
otherwise applicable interest rate of 8%, 51 the value of the benefit of the
4.44% rate is $91,785.12. 58 For a taxable estate with a marginal estate
tax rate of 55%, this savings corresponds to a $166,882.04 reduction in
the value of the estate for tax purposes. 59 Under prior law, the maximum
benefit from the preferential interest rate was equivalent to excluding a

54

A taxable estate of $1,625,000, of which $1,000,000 is attributable to a closely
held business interest that satisfies the requirements of section 6166, would produce a
tentative tax of $609,550, reduced by the credit under section 2010 (which, in 1998, is
$202,050), and thus an estate tax of $407,500. The full $407,500 would be eligible for
the preferred interest rate.
55
I.R.C. § 2053(c)(l)(D) (1994), amended by TRA 1997 § 503(b). Under prior law,
because the section 6166 interest obligation could be deducted for estate tax purposes only
as the interest payments were made, to take advantage of the deduction an executor was
required periodically to file revised estate tax returns, on which the interest paid would be
deducted as an expense of administration under section 2053(a)(3). See Chason &
Danforth, supra note I, at 113-14 n.72. The new non-deductibility rule for section 6166
interest payments should simplify the administration of estates making section 6166
elections. The new rule probably will not, however, eliminate the need for revised estate
tax returns entirely, because the estate may still want to deduct the additional fiduciary and
professional fees incurred as a result of keeping the estate open during the section 6166
deferral period. See Jonathan G. Blattmachr & Howard M. Zaritsky, Estate Planning
After the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, 87 J. TAX'N 133, 135 (1997).
56
At a marginal rate of 55%, the value of a deduction is equal to 55% of the amount
of the deduction. Accordingly, if interest is deductible, the deduction reduces the effective
rate of the interest by a factor equal to the marginal tax rate. Thus, interest payable at a
rate of 10% that is also deductible for estate tax purposes is equivalent to non-deductible
interest payments at a rate of 4.5%. Based on this analysis, the 2% interest rate under
revised section 66010) is equivalent to deductible interest incurred at a rate of 4.44%
(0.0444 multiplied times 0.45 equals 0.02).
51
The standard interest rate applicable to deferred estate taxes is the federal shortterm rate plus 3%. I.R.C. § 662l(a)(1994).
58
This number is the net present value of a $407,500 loan bearing interest at 4.44%,
assuming a discount rate of 8%, and assuming the longest possible deferral period under
section 6166.
59
This number is $91,785.12 divided by 0.55.
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$70,489.74 portion of the closely held business from estate taxes. 60 Thus,
the new interest payment rules are dramatically more beneficial to
qualifying estates than prior law. 61

III. A WORK-BASED THEORY OF THE ESTATE AND GIFf TAX
In our previous work, The Proper Role of the Estate and Gift
Taxation of Closely Held Businesses, 62 we described an economic
rationale for imposing estate and gift taxes on wealth. We first identified
the traditional rationales for imposing transfer taxes: generating revenues,
supplementing the income tax, and promoting egalitarianism. We found
all of these traditional rationales unworkable. The estate and gift tax fails
to generate substantial revenue because it applies to so few taxpayers and
because taxpayers can easily avoid it. Supplementing the income tax is
unsatisfactory as well. Congress has lacked the will to use the estate and
gift tax to bolster the progressivity of income taxation. Additionally, the
estate and gift tax is unnecessary to cure the failure of the income tax to
reach untaxed gains at a taxpayer's death; if this failure is a problem, its
best solution is a direct one. Finally, promoting egalitarianism is an
unworkable justification for the estate and gift tax. The estate tax and gift
tax may promote one liberal goal: leveling wealth. Yet, it also promotes

60

Chason & Danforth, supra note 1, at 114 & n.76.
The expansion of section 6166 under TRA 1997 is not directly relevant to a workbased model for taxing closely held businesses. Section 6166 ostensibly addresses
liquidity concerns and does not directly remove any value from the estate, nor does it
prevent the taxation of that value. Nevertheless, as observed earlier, the below-market
rate of interest under section 6166 results in a de facto forgiveness of tax for qualifying
estates. Chason & Danforth, supra note 1, at 114-15.
As observed in our earlier work, using the section 6166 preferential interest rate as
a means of effecting estate tax relief is problematic, primarily because the section 6166
requirements focus on the problem of liquidity and not on factors relevant to tax relief,
such as the presence or absence of material participation by the decedent's heirs. Chason
& Danforth, supra note 1, at 114-15 n.79. Considering that Congress only recently
liberalized the section 6166 interest payment rules, however, any attempt to persuade
Congress to take away this tax benefit would probably fall on deaf ears. Nevertheless, in
revising section 2033A -- specifically, in establishing the size of the section 2033A
exclusion -- Congress should take into account the substantial tax benefit provided to most
QFOB interests under the new section 6166 interest payment rules.
62
Chason & Danforth, supra note 1.
61
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illiberal goals: encouraging excess consumption and discouraging thrift.
We developed an alternative justification for the estate and gift tax,
based upon conventional wisdom, microeconomic theory, and empirical
research. More than one hundred years ago, Andrew Carnegie observed
that inherited wealth "deadens the talents and energies of the" heir and
"tempts him to lead a less useful and worthy life than he otherwise
would. "63 Microeconomic theory supports this hypothesis. Leisure is an
economic good, which consumers purchase by not working and foregoing
wages. Individuals tend to consume more goods (like leisure) when their
wealth increases. Empirical research shows that heirs to substantial
wealth tend to leave the work force. Interestingly, other research shows
that heirs who do not leave the work force tend not to decrease their work
efforts. 64 Thus, inherited wealth tends to affect labor supply only by
decreasing participation in the labor market. The hypothesis is also
supported by anecdotal evidence and conventional wisdom.
The estate and gift tax lessens the deterioration of work effort caused
by gifts and inheritances. First, the estate and gift tax decreases the
magnitude of gifts and inheritances. Second, and more subtly, the estate
and gift tax makes gifts and inheritances less disruptive of work effort.
As noted above, inheritances cause attrition in the labor force, but with
respect to those who do not exit the labor force, inheritances tend not to
affect the labor supply. Also, the likelihood of attrition increases with the
size of the inheritance. Hence, only large inheritances substantially affect
labor participation. The estate and gift tax system addresses this problem
by prompting donors to transfer their wealth by a stream of lifetime gifts
rather than all at death. This stream is less disruptive of participation in
the labor market.

63

Chason & Danforth, supra note 1, at 128 (quoting Andrew Carnegie, The
Advantages of Poverty, in THE GOSPEL OF WEALTH AND OTHER TIMELY ESSAYS 43, 49-

50 (1933)).
64
As we discussed in greater detail in our earlier work, Chason & Danforth, supra
note 1, at 132-35, large inheritances tend to cause heirs to exit the work force, while
smaller inheritances do not. Furthermore, the recipients of smaller inheritances tend both
not to exit the work force and not to reduce their work efforts (as measured by annual
earnings).
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If encouraging work efforts is the proper goal of estate and gift
taxation, then taxing some closely held businesses may be improper. The
estate and gift tax encourages work on the part of donees. If the donee
receives an interest in a closely held business and will manage the
business, then the donee needs no encouragement to work. Furthermore,
applying the estate and gift tax discourages the production and accumulation of capital by reducing its value to its holder. 65 Thus, applying the
estate and gift tax to some closely held businesses fails to further the goal
of the tax but retains the harmful effects on capital associated with the
tax.

IV. THE FRAMEWORK FOR A PRACTICAL EXCLUSION
FOR FAMILY-RUN BUSINESSES

A. Introduction
As stated above, the estate and gift tax discourages the accumulation
of all forms of capital, including interests in closely held businesses. 66
Previously, we assumed that the benefits of the estate and gift tax -- its
encouragement of work effort -- outweigh the harmful effects of the estate
and gift tax. 67 This general analysis does not apply to some closely held
businesses. If the donee manages the business, then the tax is unnecessary to encourage work. Yet, it still discourages accumulation of the
closely held business capital. Because the estate and gift tax has a
different effect on these family-run businesses, perhaps the tax should
apply differently to these interests.

B. Effects of Estate and Gift Taxes on Investing
Ideally, an exclusion for family-run businesses would restore the
investments in family-run businesses that individuals have failed to make
65

The estate and gift tax reduces the value of capital because it burdens one of the
holder's potential uses: giving it away. See Chason & Danforth, supra note 1, at 139-40
& n.195.
66
67

See id.
See Chason & Danforth, supra note 1, at 140-41.
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because of the estate and gift tax. Such a restoration, however, would
have a cost. Along with restoring discouraged investments in family-run
businesses, an exclusion would necessarily prefer these investments over
other investments. This preference would encourage investments in
family-run businesses that individuals would not have made in the absence
of the estate and gift tax.
Imagining the types of investments in a hypothetical world without the
estate and gift tax is useful to this analysis. Suppose that A represents the
level of investments in family-run businesses68 in the absence of an estate
and gift tax. Next, suppose that B represents the level of investments in
family-run businesses in a world with an estate and gift tax that includes
no family-run business exclusion. 69 Because the estate and gift tax only
discourages investing in family-run businesses, B is necessarily a subset
of A. Now, suppose C represents the investments in family-run

businesses under an estate and gift tax regime that includes a family-run
business exclusion. Because C is an exclusion from tax it will necessarily
include all of B.

68

By "family-run businesses." we mean closely held businesses in which a successive
generation will materially participate.
69
B is not purely hypothetical. Roughly. it represents the level of investment in
family-run businesses before TRA 1997.
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C. A Practical Exclusion for Family-Run Businesses
Any exclusion will be imperfect in two ways. First, the exclusion
will not restore all of the investments in family-run businesses that would
have been made absent estate taxes. That is to say, A cannot be a subset
of C. Any exclusion that would restore all of A would be too broad. A
broad exclusion would encourage investments in family-run businesses for
purely tax-motivated reasons by allowing taxpayers to convert assets into
a family-run business with little cost. More importantly, a broad
exclusion would exempt from the estate and gift tax assets (such as
passive investments) that are not true family-run businesses. A familyrun business is an inherently vague concept, which must be codified with
reasonable certainty for the exclusion to be effective. This codification
would have to be broad to restore all lost investments in family-run
businesses, and the breadth would almost certainly cover assets that are
not true family-run businesses.
Conversely, any practical exclusion would inadvertently encourage
investments in family-run businesses that would not have been made in
the absence of estate taxes. That is to say, C cannot be a subset of A.
Any exclusion that would prevent all tax-motivated70 investing would be
too narrow. A narrow exclusion must limit the class of qualifying
businesses and the value of the exclusion to prevent tax-motivated
investing in family-run businesses. Yet, a narrow exclusion would be
70

By tax motivated, we do not mean a conscious motivation to avoid taxes.
Potential investors will decide whether to invest in family-run businesses by analyzing the
returns such businesses would produce and by considering other issues, such as the
associated lifestyle and the ability to pass their businesses on to their heirs. Investors
would value these monetary and non-monetary returns to arrive at a net present value of
the opportunity. Investors would then compare the value of this opportunity with the
value of alternative opportunities and pursue the one with highest net present value. See
STEPHEN A. ROSS ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATE FINANCE at 229-32 (3d ed.
1993)(analyzing potential investments using net present values).
An estate tax exclusion makes family-run businesses comparatively more favorable
than other investments. Presumably, investors consider negative cash flows associated
with estate and gift taxes when choosing their investments. q. Chason & Danforth, supra
note 1, at 139-40 & n.l95 (discussing the value associated with the ability to transfer
wealth). Relative to other investments, family-run businesses would have higher cash
flows under an exclusion. The higher cash flows would make the opportunity more
valuable, thus encouraging additional investments in family-run businesses.
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unlikely to restore lost investments because the limitations would apply to
all family-run businesses. Furthermore, a narrow exclusion may contain
several complex requirements to ensure that only true family-run
businesses qualify. Complexity, however, would .create costs for
taxpayers and the government and might also undermine the public's faith
in the tax system.
Thus, creating an ideal estate and gift tax exclusion for family-run
businesses is problematic. If the exclusion is too broad, it will encourage
tax-motivated investments in family-run businesses and will allow
favorable treatment for passive assets. If the exclusion is too narrow, it
will not meaningfully restore the investments in family-run businesses that
would not have been made because of estate taxes. Additionally, a
narrow exclusion may also be complex and, therefore, costly to
administer. Thus, no exclusion will be perfect. No exclusion will restore
all investments lost to estate taxes (i.e., restore all of A), prevent all taxmotivated investing (i.e., keep C bounded by A), and not generate
significant costs of compliance for the government and taxpayers.
Even though no exclusion will be perfect, an exclusion for family-run
businesses may be practical. A practical exclusion would have three
characteristics. First, it would minimize complexity. Second, it would
clearly define an interest in a family-run business to ensure participation
in the business by the beneficiaries and to prevent abuse. Third, it would
set and limit the benefit of the exclusion.
A practical exclusion would minimize complexity. Complexity would
make an exclusion expensive for the government and taxpayers to
administer. Taxpayers would need more professional assistance in their
planning, and the government would need to devote more resources to
supervising taxpayer behavior. Complexity would also make it difficult
for taxpayers to rely on the exclusion and thus decrease the likelihood that
taxpayers would engage in the activity the exclusion was designed to
promote. Taxpayers would be uncertain whether they would qualify
under a complex exclusion. Naturally, they would not want to make
investments that may fail to generate tax savings or that may create an
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expensive controversy with the government. 71
A clearly defmed provision would encourage investment in family-run
businesses and curtail the use of the exclusion for the transfer of other
assets. The key element of defining a family-run business is participation
by the heir. 72 As we have previously argued, the estate and gift tax
operates to encourage work efforts by heirs. Thus, the tax should apply
differently if the heir operates the business. A secondary element of
defming a family-run business is preventing the transfer of other assets to
fall within the exclusion. Providing an exclusion for family-run
businesses encourages individuals to use the exclusion to transfer other,
often passive, assets. A practical exclusion, therefore, would defme a
family-run business as an active business. It would also exclude passive
assets from special treatment.
A practical exclusion would provide an ascertainable and limited
benefit. The benefit should be ascertainable so that taxpayers can rely on
the value of the benefit. If the value of the benefit is not ascertainable,
taxpayers will hesitate to invest in family-run businesses and to plan for
the exclusion. 73 Additionally, the benefit should probably be limited.
Although this is an empirical question, an unlimited benefit would
probably encourage too much tax-motivated investing in family-run

71

Put in financial terms, complexity decreases the expected value of the exclusion.
Suppose that p is the probability of success in planning for the exclusion, x is the cost of
planning for and administering the exclusion, and ~ is the benefit of the exclusion. Thus,
the expected value of the exclusion is p~- x. Complexity decreases p (the probability of
successful planning), increases x (the cost of planning and administering), and thus
decreases the expected value of the exclusion.
72
Cf Chason & Danforth, supra note 1, at 141-43 (discussing the participation of
heirs).
73
A variable benefit increases risk. For example, the benefit under the present
version of section 2033A depends upon the year in which the taxpayer dies. See supra
Subsection II.A.l. The taxpayer may be able to estimate the expected benefit, but the
expected benefit will not be certain.
The benefit from the exclusion is a return on the investment in the business and in the
planning for the exclusion. Individuals typically require a higher return on investments
that have a higher risk. See Ross, supra note 65, at 256. Because a variable benefit
makes the return riskier, taxpayers will require a greater return under a variable benefit
than under a set benefit. As a corollary, a variable benefit will thus discourage some
taxpayers from seeking the exclusion.
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businesses.

D. Summary
The estate and gift tax discourages investments in family-run
businesses. An exclusion might restore some of these investments, but
the restoration would be imperfect and perhaps costly. An exclusion that
restores all lost investments would encourage tax-motivated investments
in family-run businesses and might also extend to passive assets. An
exclusion that prevents all such abuses would not meaningfully restore
lost investments in family-run businesses and might also be costly to
administer. Even though no exclusion will be perfect, an exclusion may
still be practical. A practical exclusion for family-run businesses would
clearly defme a family-run business, minimize complexity, and limit the
benefits of the exclusion. As the next section discusses, section 2033A
fails to satisfy this description of a practical exclusion.

V. TOWARD A PRACTICAL FAMILY-RUN BUSINESS EXCLUSION
A. Introduction
A practical estate-tax exclusion for family-run businesses would
clearly defme a family-run business to encourage beneficiaries' work
efforts and to limit transfers of passive assets. It would minimize
complexity. And, it would limit the benefits of the exclusion to an
ascertainable amount that does not vary with unrelated factors.
Section 2033A, in significant part, fails this description of a practical
exclusion, although some elements of the provision do comport with the
description. This Part catalogues some major elements of section 2033A.
Section B analyzes the tests for liquidity and concentration of ownership
and concludes that the tests improperly deny the exclusion to some
businesses that deserve it. Section C analyzes the restrictions on passive
assets and concludes that section 2033A successfully and properly
restricts the tax-free transfer of passive assets. Section D analyzes how
section 2033A calculates the maximum size of the exclusion and
concludes that this calculation distorts the benefit of the exclusion by
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linking it to the applicable exclusion amount. Section E considers the
manner in which debt reduces the size of the exclusion and concludes that
section 2033A improperly reduces the exclusion by debts that may have
no connection with the family-run business. Section F analyzes the
material-participation requirements. Subsection F .1 concludes that these
requirements properly require heirs to work in the business as a
prerequisite to the exclusion. Subsection F.2 concludes that, although
requiring pre-death participation distorts the benefit of the exclusion,
retaining a pre-death participation requirement is probably necessary to
prevent abusive planning techniques. Section G considers the absence of
a QFOB exclusion for gifts and concludes that any extension of the
exclusion to gifts would be too complex. Section H analyzes the basis
rules for property subject to a section 2033A election and concludes that
the present rules properly maintain the level of benefit of the exclusion.
Section I summarizes these conclusions.

B. The Liquidity and Concentration-of-Ownership Tests
In defining family-run businesses, section 2033A wrongly focuses on
the liquidity of the estate. 74 Section 2033A imposes two liquidity tests.
First, no QFOB may have publicly traded debt or equity.75 Congress
probably thought that, if the QFOB interests were publicly traded, then
the estate could readily dispose of them to pay estate taxes. 76 Second, the
estate must meet a complicated fifty-percent liquidity test. 77 Roughly
speaking, the fifty-percent liquidity test requires that the value of the
QFOB equal at least fifty percent of the value of the estate. Congress
probably thought that, if. interests in the QFOB were a comparatively

74

Technically, the liquidity tests are not part of the definition of a QFOB. Yet, by
denying the exclusion to those estates that fail the tests, the tests are essentially part of the
definition.
75
See I.R.C. § 2033A(e)(2)(B).
76
Perhaps the existence of publicly traded securities shows that the business is not
truly family-owned. In any event, it is hard to imagine that a publicly traded company
would meet many of the other requirements of section 2033A. As we later observe, see
infra notes 86-88 and accompanying text, denying QFOB status to publicly traded
companies, while wrongly premised on the question of liquidity, is probably harmless and
may also serve to prevent some tax-motivated planning techniques.
77
See supra Subsection II.A.3 .
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small part of the estate, then the estate could sell other assets to pay estate
taxes attributable to the business.
The exclusion for interests in QFOBs should not contain the fiftypercent liquidity requirement. If liquidity is a problem for an estate, then
Congress should address illiquidity rather than forgive the tax. 78 The
Code already allows deferral of estate taxes under section 6166. 79 If
section 6166 is insufficient to remedy present illiquidity problems, then
Congress should expand it. 80 Liquidity should not preclude an estate from
having an exclusion if encouraging work efforts by donees justifies the
exclusion. That is, if the recipients of the closely held business will
manage the business, then the exclusion should apply regardless of
whether the estate is liquid.
Removing the fifty-percent liquidity requirement would also simplify
section 2033A. The fifty-percent liquidity test creates much of the
complexity of section 2033A. 81 The calculation for the test relies on at
least eleven independent variables.82 Abandoning this complicated
calculation would have several positive benefits. It would decrease the
costs of administering the exclusion and planning for the exclusion. It
would restore more investments in family-run businesses. And, it would

78

79
80

See Chason & Danforth, supra note 1, at 114-15 n.79.
See supra Section II.B.

By expanding section 6166, we do not mean that Congress should increase the
indirect tax benefit associated with the preferential section 6166 interest rate. See supra
note 61 (arguing that tax relief, if appropriate, should be provided directly, not indirectly
through favorable interest rates). Rather, we mean that section 6166 could be expanded,
for example, to cover a larger number of estates, to extend the due date of the first
principal installment, or to reduce each principal installment by permitting a longer overall
deferral period.
81
Cf supra Subsection II .A.3 (discussing the liquidity test).
82
These variables are as follows: ( 1) the value of QFOB interests; (2) gifts of QFOB
interests to family members taken into account under section 2001(b)(l)(B); (3) gifts of
QFOB interests to family members that qualify for the gift tax annual exclusion; (4) other
gifts of QFOB interests included in the gross estate; (5) the value of the gross estate; (6)
deductions under sections 2053(a)(3) and (4); (7) gifts to the decedent's spouse within 10
years of death; (8) gifts of non-QFOB interests to family members within 3 years of death
other than annual exclusion gifts; (9) indebtedness on a qualified residence; (10)
indebtedness for medical and educational purposes; (ll) indebtedness under $10,000.
I.R.C. § 2033A(b)-(d).
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more completely further the goal of encouraging donees' work efforts.
The main negative effect would be a loss of revenue. ·If Congress
perceives that the revenue loss would be too high, however, it should
limit the magnitude of the benefit rather than denying it to some estates on
an arbitrary basis.
Section 2033A also includes a concentration-of-ownership test. To
satisfy the test, ownership in the business must be sufficiently concentrated in one, two, or three families. The decedent's family will satisfy
the test if it owns fifty percent of the QFOB. If the decedent's family
fails to own fifty percent but owns at least thirty percent, the test is
satisfied if two families (including the decedent's) collectively own
seventy percent, or three families collectively own ninety percent.
Does requiring concentration of ownership further the work efforts of
donees? That is, if the donee materially participates in the trade or
business, should the degree of concentration of ownership determine the
availability of the exclusion? If publicly traded stock were eligible for the
QFOB exclusion, then not requiring concentration of ownership could
encourage tax -motivated investments in an heir's employer. For example,
if an individual's only child worked in a management position for a large
corporation, the individual might be encouraged to invest a large amount
in the child's employer to avoid estate taxes. This example seems a bit
unlikely, 83 however, even in the absence of the requirement that was
assumed away. Hence, the ownership test is probably unnecessary to
achieve any meaningful goal under section 2033A.
Moreover, the percentage requirements based on multiple-family
ownership could produce the odd result that one family's interest will
qualify for the exclusion while the interest held by another family in the
same business will not. Consider, for example, Corporation X, an active
trade or business, which is owned thirty percent by A and members of A's
family, twenty-five percent by Band members of B' s family, and thirty-

83

First, the individual would have to liquidate present investments, possibly
generating capital gains taxation. Second, the individual would likely have an
undiversified investment portfolio after the conversion. Third, the child would have to
participate materially in the corporation, without a controlling interest, for an extended
period after the individual's death. All of these factors argue against such odd planning.
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five percent by C and members of C's family~ the remaining ten percent
is owned by several key employees. Assuming that there is no overlap
among the families and that the key employees are not related to A, B, or
C, A and C's estates will qualify for the exclusion, 84 but B's estate will
not. 85 Furthermore, because the definition of "family" does not include
unrelated long-term employees, 86 A and C would be reluctant to agree to
any additional distributions of stock to key employees, because to do so
would both (1) cause A and A's family to fail the thirty-percent tests' and
(2) cause both A and C and their families to fail the ninety-percent
ownership test that applies to businesses owned by three families. 88
The concentration-of-ownership rules may also disqualify an estate for
the exclusion as the result of some action beyond the decedent's control.
For instance, if A in the previous example had made annual exclusion
gifts of X stock to the spouse of one of A •s children, a subsequent divorce
would disqualify the former spouse as a member of A's family. The
change in marital status would cause the percentage ownership of A and
A's family to fall below thirty percent, with the result that A's estate
would no longer be eligible for the exclusion. 89 Note that the divorce
would also disqualify C' s estate for the exclusion, because the three
families would thereafter own less than ninety percent of the business in
the aggregate. Similarly, any transfer by C to a person who is not a
member of C's family (such as a stepchild of C's child)90 would disqualify
both A and C' s estates for the exclusion.
Section 2033A also restricts the benefits of the exclusion to businesses

84

This example assumes that A and C's estates satisfy all of the other section 2033A
requirements.
85
See I.R.C. § 2033A(e)(l)(B)(ii)(providing that, in the case of multiple-family
ownership, the decedent owner's estate will not qualify for the exclusion unless the
decedent and the decedent's family own at least 30% of the business).
86
I.R.C. § 2033A(i)(2)(incorporating section 2032A(e)(2) by reference) . Cf I.R.C.
§ 2033A(i)(l)(B)(defining "qualified heir" to include certain long-term employees).
87
See supra note 85.
88
I.R.C. § 2033A(e)(l)(B)(i)(III).
89
See I.R.C. § 2032A(e)(2)(1994)(defining family member).
90
See id. (including an adopted child, but not a stepchild, of a descendant as a family
member).
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that have no publicly traded debt or equity. 91 Although this rule focuses
improperly on the liquidity of the decedent's business interest, in most
cases the rule will not disqualify an otherwise qualifying business. 92 The
rule may also curb the tax-motivated, though unlikely, planning technique
described earlier, in which the decedent invests in the employer of the
decedent's child. 93 Furthermore, unlike the fifty -percent liquidity test, the
rule disqualifying publicly traded stock and debt does not unduly
complicate the statute and, because it establishes a bright-line test, it
should not significantly increase the costs of planning or compliance.
To summarize the conclusions of this Section, the fifty-percent
liquidity test is impractical. It distorts the definition of a family-run
business by requiring illiquidity, and it complicates planning and
administration with its unwieldy formula.
The concentration-ofownership test is probably unnecessary, and it has the potential to unfairly
deny the exclusion to some families and to distort the decisions owners
make about the proper ownership structure of their businesses. The
requirement that the business not be publicly traded distorts the definition
of a family-run business as well, but this requirement is simple and
probably harmless, and its retention may help to prevent certain taxmotivated planning. 94

C. Passive Assets and the Trade or Business Requirement
Section 2033A is not overly generous, as it prevents taxpayers from
using QFOBs as vehicles for transferring passive assets. First, section
2033A disallows any exclusion for a business if more than thirty-five
percent of the income of the business came from passive sources. 95
Second, section 2033A reduces the value of the QFOB by the value of
passive assets not needed for working capital. 96 The thirty-five percent

91

See I.R.C. § 2033A(e)(2)(B).
Only rarely, for example, would a qualified heir of an interest in a publicly traded
company be likely to satisfy the post-death material-participation requirement.
93
See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
94
See supra text accompanying note 83.
95
See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text .
96
See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
92
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test is unnecessary because the statute already reduces the value of the
business by its excess passive assets. For example, if f.:>rty percent of the
income of a business is from passive assets, the appropriate response is to
disqualify the passive assets, not to disqualify the entire business. en The
thirty-five percent test is a trap for the unwary that is usually easy to
avoid with careful planning98 yet serves no purpose.
Section 2033A requires that a QFOB be a "trade or business." This
requirement deters taxpayers from using the exclusion to transfer passive
assets. The trade-or-business requirement thus comports with the goal of
promoting the work efforts of donees. The recipient of passive assets will
not engage in any meaningful work associated with the assets. Rather,
the unfettered transfer of passive assets would allow the recipient to
engage in a decreased work effort. 99 A practical exclusion should apply
only to assets that will support meaningful work efforts by the recipient.
A trade or business is an active business enterprise. 100 Thus, the trade-orbusiness requirement and the limitation on passive assets under section
2033A seem to accomplish the task of filtering out those assets that will
not support meaningful work efforts.

.

Section 2033A has a predominately practical approach in limiting its
benefit to active businesses only. First, it reduces the value of the
business to the extent of any passive assets. Second, it requires the
business to carry on a trade or business. These two elements are essential
to a practical estate-tax exclusion for family-run businesses.

en Perhaps the 35% limitation on passive income could serve as a bright-line test,
deeming any business holding that level of passive assets not to be an active trade or
business. Rather than disqualify the entire business, however, a bright-line test should
disqualify passive assets over a certain level.
98
The business owner can usually create a separate entity to hold the passive assets.
99
See Chason & Danforth, supra note 1, at 132-35 (describing how recipients of
wealth tend to exit the labor force).
100
See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text (describing the trade-or-business
requirement).
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D. The Size of the Exclusion
Section 2033A determines the amount of the exclusion in a perverse
manner. The maximum amount of the exclusion is $1,300,000 less the
applicable exclusion amount. 101 The applicable exclusion amount,
however, will increase from $625,000 in 1998 to $1,000,000 in 2006.
Therefore, the maximum QFOB exclusion will decline by over fifty
percent by 2006. 102 Moreover, the operation of the five percent estate tax
surcharge under section 2001(c)(2) eliminates the benefits of the QFOB
exclusion for very large estates. 103
Explaining why Congress chose to reduce the benefit over time is
difficult. Congress may have decided that business interests worth
$1,300,000 are the appropriate amount to exclude from estate taxes, but
that a decedent should not be able to make any additional, nondeductible

101

102

See supra note 9 and accompanying text.

Furthermore, the decrease in the maximum QFOB exclusion is not properly
coordinated with the increase in the applicable exclusion amount. This lack of
coordination exists because the QFOB exclusion represents a tax benefit at the estate's
highest marginal tax rates, while the applicable exclusion amount under section 2010
represents a benefit at the lowest marginal rates. A simple example illustrates the
problem. Assume an estate consists solely of QFOB interests worth $1,400,000. If the
owner died in 1998, the applicable exclusion amount under section 2010(c) would be
$625,000, and the maximum QFOB exclusion would be $675,000. The tax on the excess
$100,000 of value would be $37,000. If the owner died in 2006, the applicable exclusion
amount would be $1,000,000, and the maximum QFOB exclusion would be $300,000.
Under these circumstances, however, the tax on the excess $100,000 would be $41,000.
The difference in the two amounts of taxes is attributable to the loss of the QFOB
exclusion benefit at the highest marginal rate, which is not fully offset by the increase in
the applicable exclusion amount benefit at the lowest marginal rate. A technical correction
bill has proposed a solution to this problem, but the cure appears to be worse than the
disease: the bill would create a complicated system for determining the maximum QFOB
exclusion, which would vary with the absolute size of the decedent's estate. See H.R.
2645, 105th Cong. § 6(b)(1)(1997).
103
TRA 1997 modified section 2001(c)(2) to ensure that the 5% surcharge will offset
the benefits of the applicable exclusion amount as that amount increases from 1998 to
2006. See I.R.C. § 2001(c)(2)(1994), amended by TRA 1997 § 501(a)(l)(D). The
purpose of the surcharge is to cause large estates to be taxed at a flat rate of 55%. This
offsets the advantages of both the lower marginal rates and the unified credit. The manner
in which TRA 1997 amended section 2001(c)(2), however, ensures that the 5% surcharge
will also offset any benefits of section 2033A.
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transfers without generating taxes. 104 Yet, if interests in a family-run
business represent unique assets, then any exclusion of their value should
be in addition to the applicable exclusion amount. Thus, the maximum
exclusion for QFOB interests should be a set amount that is indexed for
inflation. 105
In the previous Part, we argued that the exclusion for family-run
businesses should have a set and limited benefit. Section 2033A fails in
this regard because its benefit is coordinated with the applicable exclusion
amount and thus varies from year to year. Rather than have a benefit that
is coordinated with the applicable exclusion amount, section 2033A
should have a set benefit that is indexed to inflation. In addition, section
2001(c)(2) should be amended to ensure that the benefit is not reduced or
eliminated for very large estates.

E. Treatment of Debt
The distinction between business and non-business debt is important
in determining the size of the section 2033A exclusion. Business debt
reduces the value of the business. The value of the business, in turn,
establishes the maximum amount of the exclusion. This Section considers
the propriety of further reducing the exclusion by certain non-business
debt.
Section 2033A(a) limits the QFOB exclusion to the lesser of (1) the
"adjusted value" of the QFOB interest or (2) the excess of $1,300,000
over the applicable exclusion amount. Section 2033A(d) defines
"adjusted value" as the estate tax value of the QFOB interest reduced by
the amount of most of the decedent's debts, other than certain "qualified

104

Congress may have used a decreasing exclusion to avoid future revenue loss.
Indeed, by formulating section 2033A as it did, Congress could promote the legislation as
a $1,300,000 exclusion without losing the revenue that would be associated with a true
exclusion of $1,300,000.
105
Alternatively, the exclusion could exclude a set amount and then a percentage of
the value over that amount.
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debts," such as mortgages on a residence. 106 Thus, the adjusted-value rule
of section 2033A limits the amount that can be excluded to the value of
the QFOB interest less the value of debts other than qualified debts. In
effect, the adjusted-value rule attributes all debt, other than qualified debt,
to the closely held business. As illustrated by the following example, the
apparent purpose of this rule is to ensure that businesses operated as
entities are treated in a similar manner as businesses operated as sole
proprietorships. 107
Consider two taxpayers, A and B. Each is the sole owner of a trade
or business that would satisfy the requirements of section 2033A. A
operates his business as a sole proprietorship; B operates her business as
a corporation. Each has made lifetime gifts equal to the applicable
exclusion amount, 108 so that every asset of the estate other than those that
are excluded under section 2033A will be subject to estate tax. Assume
that each business comprises assets having a value of $500,000. Each of
A and B has non-business assets of $150,000. A has a personal debt of
$110,000, whichis deductible under section 2053(a)(4). B's corporation
has a corporate debt of $100,000; the net value of B's corporation (assets
less liabilities) is therefore $400,000. B has a personal debt of $10,000,
which is deductible under section 2053(a)(4).

106

More specifically, section 2033A(d) defmes the term "adjusted value" as the value
for estate tax purposes (ignoring section 2033A) of the QFOB interest reduced by the
excess of (1) amounts deductible as claims against the estate under section 2053(a)(3) or
as indebtedness with respect to property included in the estate under section 2053(a)(4)
over (2) certain types of indebtedness (referred to as "qualified debt" or "qualified
indebtedness" in this discussion). Qualified indebtedness is indebtedness on a residence,
the interest on which is deductible under section 163(h)(3), indebtedness incurred to pay
certain educational and medical expenses, and other indebtedness not in excess of
$10,000. I.R.C. § 2033A(d).
107
Another purpose of the rule may be to prevent an individual from borrowing
money in anticipation of death to acquire a QFOB; in most cases, however, a business
interest so acquired would fail to satisfy the pre-death material-participation requirement.
See su&ra text accompanying note 26.
1
This example also assumes that the lifetime gifts are not of such a type that they
would cause the estate to fail to satisfy the 50% liquidity test under section
2033A(b)(l)(C). See supra Subsection II.A.3 (describing the liquidity test, which takes
into account certain inter vivos transfers); see also supra notes 78-82 and accompanying
text (advocating repeal of liquidity test).
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In both A and B's estates, the "adjusted value" of the QFOB interest
will be $400,000,109 and the exclusion will therefore be limited to that
amount. In each estate, the amount subject to estate tax will be $140,000,
calculated as follows:
Taxpayer A

Taxpayer B

Business property

500,000

400,000

Non-business property

150,000

150,000

Assets includible in estate

650,000

550,000

Section 2033A exclusion

(400,000)

(400,000)

Section 2053(a)(4) deduction

(110,000)

(10,000)

140,000

140,000

Net estate

Thus, as a result of the adjusted-value limitation, both estates are entitled
to the same exclusion, notwithstanding that the value of B' s business is
$100,000 less than the value of A's business.
As this example illustrates, the adjusted-value limitation attributes all
non-qualified debt to the QFOB, and the value of the QFOB is decreased
accordingly. This rule is overly broad under certain circumstances.
Suppose that A in the above example had incurred the $110,000 debt in
connection with acquiring rental real estate, which was his only nonQFOB asset. The real estate, worth $150,000, secures the debt.
Assuming that A dies in 1998, when the applicable exclusion amount (all
of which has been consumed by A's lifetime gifts) is $625,000, the

109

In A's estate, this amount is determined by subtracting A's non-qualified debt
($100,000) from the value of the QFOB interest, disregarding section 2033A ($500,000);
in B's estate, this amount is determined simply by reference to the value of the QFOB
interest ($400,000). See I.R.C. § 2033A(d). Note that this example assumes that A and
Beach have $10,000 of qualified debt. See I.R.C. § 2033A(d)(2)(C). If all of B's debt
had been held by the corporation, the available exclusion would have been $10,000 less.
This would have increased B's taxable estate by $10,000.
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$140,000 portion of A's estate that is subject to estate tax will generate a
tax of $52, 100. If A's executor wishes to avoid selling any of the QFOB
interests, A's executor must sell the rental real estate to pay estate taxes.
After satisfying the secured debt, the remaining proceeds will be
insufficient to satisfy the tax liability, which may force a partial
liquidation of the QFOB interest. This problem does not occur in B's
estate, because non-qualified debt is not associated with the non-QFOB
property. If the adjusted-value rule had not reduced the section 2033A .
exclusion in A's estate, the amount of property subject to estate tax at A's
death would have been only $40,000. This would have generated a tax of
$14,800; both the tax and the secured debt would have been covered by
the value of the real estate. Under these circumstances, the adjustedvalue limitation has improperly attributed all of A's non-qualified debt to
A's business.
The adjusted-value limitation also produces disparate tax results
depending on whether a taxpayer decides to fmance business activities
with borrowing or with existing resources. Suppose each of C and D ( 1)
owns a corporation (a QFOB) with assets of $400,000 and no debt, (2)
has personal assets of $200,000 and personal debt of $10,000, and (3)
wants to expand the corporation by $150,000. C decides to borrow
$150,000, secured by her personal assets, and contributes the proceeds to
her corporation. D contributes $150,000 of her personal assets directly
to her corporation, which then sells the assets to expand the business.
Surprisingly, C and D are subjected to different estate tax treatments
because of their different fmancing decisions. Both corporations have a
value of $550,000. 110 Both decedents have a net estate of $590,000. 111
Yet, the value of C's QFOB interest is "adjusted" for the debt of
$150,000, whereas D's interest is not adjusted. The QFOB exclusion for
C's estate will be $400,000, whereas the exclusion for D's estate will be
$550,000. This difference is improper because it results solely from
different fmancing decisions.

110

The example assumes that the sale of assets by D's corporation produced no
capital gains.
111
C has a $550,000 corporation, $200,000 in personal assets, and $160,000 in debt
(of which $10,000 is qualified debt). D has a $550,000 corporation, $50,000 in personal
assets, and $10,000 in qualified debt.
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One potential benefit of the adjusted-value rule is that it will prevent
the owner of a business entity from liquidating before death and thereby
obtaining a larger section 2033A exclusion. 112 If there were no adjustedvalue limitation, the owner of a corporation could liquidate the corporation before death and potentially convert corporate debt (which reduces
the value of the corporation) into personal debt. 113 The risk that this
transaction will occur, however, is slight. A business entity must
typically satisfy the claims of, all creditors before liquidating. 114
Corporations often hold appreciated assets, and the shareholder115 and the
corporation116 would realize capital gains upon liquidation. The limited
liability and transfer tax valuation discounts associated with some business
entities would further deter most tax-motivated liquidations.
A better adjusted-value rule would reduce the value of the QFOB only
by debt directly attributable to the QFOB interest. The test for determining whether the debt was directly related could be whether the debt was
secured by QFOB assets. 117 To the extent that the debt was secured by
non-business assets or was unsecured, the debt would not reduce the
amount of the QFOB exclusion. This approach would have several
advantages. First, it would treat loans secured by non-business assets as

112

If a shareholder could accomplish this transaction, it might indicate that the
business assets are no longer responsible for paying the debt. That is to say, the
liquidation may shift responsibility for payment of the debt away from the business assets.
q. infra notes 117-18 and accompanying text (proposing that debts be attributed to the
assets by which they are secured).
113
To illustrate, consider B from an earlier example. See supra text accompanying
notes 108-09. If B liquidated B's corporation, after the liquidation, B would own QFOB
assets of $500,000, other assets of $150,000, and deductible debt of $110,000. Without
the adjusted-value limitation, B's estate would pay taxes on a net taxable estate of
$40,000, rather than $140,000 (the result if the business had been kept in corporate form).
114
See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-746 (Michie 1993) (establishing a procedure by
which a Virginia corporation satisfies all known claims before liquidating).
115
See I.R.C. § 33l(a)(l)(1994).
116
See I.R.C. § 336(a)(1994).
117
This rule does have the potential for giving a mild preference to proprietorships.
Unsecured debt that is directly attributable to a proprietorship (for example, accounts
payable) would not reduce the value of the proprietorship, whereas similar unsecured debt
attributable to a corporation would reduce the value for purposes of the exclusion. If the
proprietor discharged the debt with personal assets, however, this difference in treatment
would be appropriate.
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being equivalent to a contribution of additional property to the business.
This would help to avoid the liquidity problem described earlier and
would also ensure that a person who liquidates a non-business asset and
adds the proceeds to the QFOB would be treated the same as the person
who pledges non-business assets and contributes the loan proceeds to the
QFOB. Second, this approach would provide a bright-line test for
determining whether a loan is properly attributable to the business. If the
loan is secured by business property, it reduces the value of the business
in a real sense. Finally, this approach would simplify the adjusted-value
limitation, by taking into account only debt secured by business
property. 118
By attributing most of the decedent's debt to the family-run business,
section 2033A creates inconsistencies in setting the value of the exclusion.
First, debt attributable to personal assets is deemed business debt under
section 2033A. Second, the debt attribution rule creates different results
based on how business owners fmance business expansion. The best
solution to this problem is to attribute debt to the business only when
secured by business assets.

F. Material Participation

1. Participation After Decedent's Death
Requiring work effort by heirs after the decedent's death is central to
a practical estate-tax exclusion for family-run businesses. 119 As discussed
in Part IV, participation by heirs should be part of the definition of a
family-run business that qualifies for an estate-tax exclusion. Without this
requirement, the heirs could sell their interest or passively operate the
business and thereby fail to satisfy the goal of promoting productive
activities.

118

One example of simplification is that the change would eliminate the difficult
tracing requirement of section 2033A(d)(2)(B), which requires the taxpayer to establish
that "the proceeds of . . . indebtedness were used for the payment of educational and
medical expenses of the decedent, the decedent's spouse, or the decedent's dependents
(within the meaning of section 152)."
119
See supra text accompanying note 72.
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Section 2033A contains such a mechanism in its recapture provisions.
If the heirs fail to participate materially in the trade or business, the estate
taxes saved from the exclusion are subject to recapture. This requirement
ensures that section 2033A principally benefits heirs who will work in
their inherited business.
Material participation is a tax euphemism for work. Section 2033A
defines material participation by reference to the material participation
rules under section 2032A. 120 The regulations under section 2032A
provide that "(a]ctual employment .. . on a substantially full-time basis
(35 hours a week or more) or to any lesser extent necessary personally to
manage fully the farm or business . . . constitutes material
participation. "121 This level of participation is sufficient under section
2032A, but is not necessary. At a minimum, a material participant will
"regularly advise or consult with the other managing partner on the
operation of the business. "122 The participant must participate in a
significant number of management decisions, inspect production activities
regularly, and assume some fmancial responsibility for the business. 123 If
an entity owns the business, section 2032A prescribes a somewhat formal
arrangement for participation. 124 Nominal status as a manager, director,
or fiduciary, without more, does not constitute material participation. 125
To avoid recapture of estate tax savings, qualified heirs 126 and their
families must materially participate. With respect to an interest held by
a qualified heir, material participation fails to occur if neither the
qualified heir nor any member of the heir's family materially participates
in the trade or business. Recapture occurs if there is insufficient material

120

See I.R.C. § 2033A(t)(l)(A) (incorporating the material-participation test under

section 2032A(c)(6)(B)).
121
Treas. Reg. § 20.2032A-3(e)(1)(1997).
122
See Treas. Reg. § 20.2032A-3(e)(2)(1997).
123

See id.
See Treas. Reg. § 20.2032A-3(t)(l)(l997).
125
See Treas. Reg. § 20.2032A-3(t)(2)(1997).
126
See I.R.C . §§ 2033A(i)(2); 2032A(e)(2)(1994) (describing qualified heirs as
124

members of the decedent's family and certain long-term employees of the trade or
business).
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participation during the ten-year period following the decedent's death. 127
Ideally, the exclusion would require participation from every recipient
of a QFOB interest rather than allowing a family member to participate
on behalf of the participant. Instead, section 2033A does allow a family
member to participate for the heir. If a decedent leaves an interest
qualifying for the exclusion to, for example, three children, only one
child must materially participate to avoid recapture.
Requiring participation by all heirs would be unworkable under the
current structure of section 2033A. It would encourage business owners
to give interests to likely nonparticipants during life-to avoid their being
treated as "heirs" -and leave interests to likely participants at death.
Requiring participation by all heirs might be workable if the exclusion
varied directly with the number of heirs. That is, the provision could
allow a decedent to exclude, for every heir, qualifying interests passing to
the heir subject to some maximum limit. Such a rule, however, would
need to trigger recapture upon any disposition to a family member.
Otherwise, heirs who did not want to participate could sell their interests
to a family member (e.g., a sibling) who does participate, while
generating a larger exclusion than if the decedent had simply left the
entire interest to the participating heir. Additionally, such a rule would
be unfair because it would favor estates of prolific decedents. Thus,
although varying the benefit with the number of participating heirs might
further the goal of promoting the heirs' work efforts, such a rule is
probably politically impractical.
Hence the material-participation test under section 2033A (as adapted
from section 2032A) works some compromises. To discourage unwieldy
127

As discussed above, the decedent or the decedent's family must have materially
participated in the business before the decedent's death for the estate to qualify for the
exclusion. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. Additionally, whether or not taxes
are recaptured depends upon pre-death and post-death participation. During any eight year
period ending after the decedent's death, there may not be periods aggregating three years
during which material participation fails to occur. Material participation fails to occur
during the decedent's life if neither the decedent nor any member of the decedent's family
materially participates. Material participation fails to occur after the decedent's death if
neither the qualified heir nor any member of the qualified heir's family materially
participates. See I.R.C. § 2032A(c)(6)(B)(1994).
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planning, it allows any family member of an heir to participate on behalf
of the heir. It also grants the same benefit, regardless of the number of
participating heirs, to avoid unfair discrimination of estates with few
heirs. Thus, these material-participation requirements comport with the
structure of a practical exclusion proposed in Part IV.

2. Participation Before Decedent's Death
Requiring participation before the decedent's death is not directly
related to the description of a family-run business proposed above.
Following this description, a practical exclusion for family-run businesses
requires participation by the heirs, and it also requires a limitation on the
transfer of passive assets. The exclusion does not, however, mandate
participation by the decedent or the decedent's family before the
decedent's death. As explained in this Subsection, requiring pre-death
material participation may distort the expected benefit of the exclusion, 128
which in tum increases planning costs. Nevertheless, as this Subsection
further explains, requiring pre-death participation may be necessary to
ensure that qualifying for the exclusion is not too easy, which would
encourage excess investments.
Section 2033A in its present form requires material participation
before the decedent's death. The decedent or the decedent's family must
have participated in the business for five of eight years before the
decedent's death. 129 Congress may have thought that requiring no predeath participation would have made a family-run business too attractive
for tax planning. That is, not requiring pre-death participation might
encourage excess investment in family-run businesses.
As described above, this Article argues that section 2033A should not
contain a liquidity test. 130 If the family-run business exclusion does not

128

See infra note 135 and accompanying text (observing that the rule unfairly
disqualifies estates of decedents who die prematurely).
129
See I.R.C. § 2033A(b)(l)(D); see also supra note 127 (describing how the
recapture provisions measure pre-death participation in addition to post-death participation).
130
See supra Section V.B.
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contain the liquidity test, then the pre-death material-participation
requirement is probably necessary to prevent abuse. Suppose that the
exclusion contained no liquidity test or pre-death participation requirement. Under such a rule, an individual could invest in a business 131 that
employs the individual's child, leave the business interest to the child, and
obtain a tax benefit under the exclusion if the child continues to work in
the business. The absence of a liquidity test increases the viability of this
technique, because in order to obtain the benefits of the exclusion, the
individual is not compelled to invest a substantial portion of his or her
assets in the business. Retaining the pre-death material participation
requirement would increase the stakes of the individual's investment,
because the exclusion would be available only if the decedent had
survived for at least five years and only if the child had continued to work
for the employer during that period. 132 This would, in turn, decrease the
likelihood that the investment was for purely tax-avoidance purposes.
Retaining the pre-death participation requirement thus makes qualifying
for the exclusion more difficult, which should curb excess, tax-motivated
investments in closely held businesses.
Preventing this technique and its undesired results would have costs.
The exclusion should operate to restore investments in family-run
businesses that were discouraged by reason of the estate tax. 133 The
exclusion necessarily encourages both types of investments, 134 but
requiring pre-death participation also discourages both types of investments. Requiring pre-death participation also distorts the expected benefit
131

The rule denying the exclusion for publicly traded business interests is a
substantial impediment to this planning technique. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text (discussing the prohibition on extending the exclusion to publicly traded
corporations and arguing that the prohibition should be retained). As a practical matter,
if the child's employer is closely held, it will be difficult for the individual to acquire an
interest in the employer, unless the child already holds a controlling interest.
132
See I.R.C. § 2033A(b)(l)(D); see also supra note 26 and accompanying text
(noting that the pre-death material-participation requirement may be satisfied by a member
of the decedent's family).
133
See supra note 74 and accompanying text (describing restoration of discouraged
investments as one reason to have a family-run business exclusion).
134
Above, we identified two types of investments that the exclusion would
encourage: investments that would have been made absent any estate or gift tax (restored
investment) and investments that would not have been made absent any estate or gift tax
(excess investment). See supra Section IV.B.
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of the exclusion indirectly. If a new business owner dies within five
years of making the investment, the estate will receive no benefit. 135 Yet,
if the owner lives for five years and participates until death, the estate will
receive a benefit. Thus, the benefit of the exclusion is tied to an external
variable: the timing of the decedent's death. 136 This creates uncertainty,
and as we earlier observed, uncertainty about the availability of the
exclusion increases planning costs. 137
In summary, requiring pre-death participation is probably necessary
to prevent abuse, especially if Congress abandons the liquidity test.
Preventing this abuse, however, weakens the exclusion and is not without
costs. First, requiring pre-death material participation will make the
exclusion unavailable to some active businesses in which the heirs will
participate. Second, tying the availability of the benefit to the time of the
decedent's death distorts the expected benefit from the exclusion.

G. Application to Gifts
The estate and gift tax is a unified system, which taxes gratuitous
transfers of wealth. 138 Transfers at death and during life are substantially
similar, and should thus receive similar treatment under the estate and gift
tax. 139 Yet, extending the section 2033A exclusion to gifts would generate
considerable complexity. Thus, the family-run business exclusion should
apply only to transfers at death.
Section 2033A applies only to transfers at death, and extending it to
gifts would be virtually impossible. The liquidity test of section 2033A
requires the estate to value all its assets and determine whether the familyowned business interests constitute fifty percent of the gross estate, once

135

Compare this result with the result if the qualified heir dies before the expiration
of the 10-year post-death material-participation period; in the latter case, the material
participation requirement is forgiven. See I.R.C . §2033A(t)(l).
136
Cf. supra Section V. D (arguing that the benefit should not be tied to the applicable
exclusion amount).
137
See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
138
See Chason & Danforth, supra note 1, at 107-10.
139
But cf id. (discussing distinctions between the estate and gift taxes).
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both amounts are adjusted for debts and prior gifts. 140 This process is not
unduly cumbersome for the decedent's estate because the estate must
value its assets in order to determine its estate tax liability. The gift tax
does not, however, require such a comprehensive process of valuation.
Rather, the gift tax requires the donor to value only the assets transferred
and any prior taxable gifts.
Yet, the government could not extend the exclusion to gifts and
abandon the liquidity test only for gifts. Abandoning the liquidity test for
gift tax purposes while retaining it for estate tax purposes would allow
business owners to avoid the test by making transfers during life.
Applying the liquidity test to inter vivos transfers would, however, create
an enormous administrative burden on the taxpayer and the
government. 141 Thus, the current version of section 2033A should not
extend to gifts.
Even if the liquidity test were not part of section 2033A, the familyowned business exclusion should not apply to gifts. Section 2033A
requires the recipient of a QFOB interest to participate in the business for
ten years after the decedent's death. 142 Extending the family-owned
business exclusion to gifts would create enormous administrative burdens
in measuring the material-participation test. For example, a donor who
makes a series of small gifts to many children over several years would
subject both his children and the government to a web of multiple
material-participation tests, each one applying to only one specific gift.
The fact that the family-owned business exclusion does not (and
should not) extend to gifts is not too troublesome. A business owner
could give some interests in the family-run business during life, while
retaining enough interests to take advantage of the exclusion at death. A
business owner could also retain sufficient control over any gifts to ensure

140

See supra notes 28-34 and accompanying text.
Some might argue that a taxpayer who is willing to take on this burden should be
allowed to do so. Even so, the government still must monitor the taxpayer and determine
whether the taxpayer has valued all assets properly.
142
See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
141
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inclusion in the estate. 143 Furthermore, but for the tax savings that gifts
may produce, 144 most business owners would probably prefer making
transfers at death rather than during life.
In the absence of administrative costs, the family-owned business
exclusion should apply to gifts. But, administrative costs from extending
the exclusion to gifts would be prohibitive. Section 2033A contains a
liquidity test, which requires a valuation of all assets of the estate.
Requiring a business owner to value all of his or her assets upon making
a gift would generate exorbitant costs for the owner and the government.
Even without the liquidity test, the ongoing material-participation
requirements would be too costly for the government and taxpayers to
administer. Because an extension to gifts would generate too much
complexity, the family-owned business exclusion should apply only to
transfers at death.

H. Income Tax Basis of Excluded Property
The basis of property acquired from a decedent is generally "the fair
market value of the property at the date of the decedent's death. "145
Before TRA 1997, 146 section 1014 established two specific exceptions to
this rule. One exception was for property subject to an alternate valuation
date election under section 2032. 147 The other exception was for property
subject to a special use valuation election under section 2032A. 148 In both
cases the property receives a basis equal to the value reported for estate
tax purposes.

143

See I.R.C. § 2035 (1994), amended by TRA 1997 § 1310(a); I.R.C. §§ 20362038 (1994); see also Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2 (stating that a gift will not generate taxes
until the donor relinquishes dominion and control over the property).
144
See Chason & Danforth, supra note 1, at 110 & n.50.
145
I.R.C. § 1014(a)(1)(1994). amended by TRA 1997 § 508(b). Because the fair
market value of property at a decedent's death usually exceeds the decedent's basis, the
section 1014 adjustment is commonly referred to as the basis "step up."
146
See infra note 151 and accompanying text (discussing new section 1014(a)(4)).
147
See I.R.C. § 1014(a)(2)(1994); see also I.R.C. § 2032(1994) (permitting an estate
under certain circumstances to elect to value estate assets as of 6 months after the
decedent's death).
148
I.R.C . § 1014(a)(3).
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TRA 1997 did not expressly modify section 1014 to provide an
exception for a QFOB interest excluded under section 2033A; based on
the following analysis, it appears that this omission was intentional.
Section 1014(a) refers to the "fair market value" of property received
from a decedent at the date of the decedent's death. The reference to fair
market value suggests that a section 2033A election should not affect the
usual basis adjustment rule, because a section 2033A election does not
affect the value of the property. Section 10 14(a) establishes two specific
exceptions to this general rule, both of which deny a date-of-death fair
market value basis if estate taxes have been calculated based on some
other value. 149 The existence of these exceptions and the fact that TRA
1997 did not expressly create an additional exception for QFOB interests
suggest that the section 2033A exclusion was not intended to alter the
normal fair market value basis rule for closely held business property. 150
Moreover, Congress expressly modified section 1014 with respect to the
exclusion from estate taxes for certain real property subject to qualified

149

See supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text (discussing section 1014(a)(2),

(3)).
150

The language of the section 1014 regulations lends some credibility to a contrary
view, i.e., that the basis step up should be denied for property excluded under section
2033A. Treasury Regulations section 1.1014-1 (a)(l997) states that the purpose of section
1014 is "to provide a basis for property acquired from a decedent which is equal to the
value placed upon such property for purposes of the Federal estate tax. " Treasury
Regulations§ 1.1014-2(b)(l)(l997) suggests that a condition for property to receive the
benefits of section 1014 is that it be "includible in the decedent's gross estate. " One could
reasonably deduce from these provisions that section 2033A property should not receive
a section 1014 basis adjustment at death because, as a result of the QFOB exclusion, the
"value" of the property is disregarded for estate tax purposes and is not "includible" in the
gross estate. See I.R.C. § 2033A(a)(stating that the "value of the gross estate shall not
include .. . the adjusted value of the qualified family-owned business interests," subject
to a maximum dollar exclusion amount(emphasis added)); I.R.C. § 2033A(b)(2)(stating
that "qualified family-owned business interests . . . are the interests which . . . are
included in determining the value of the gross estate (without regard to this section)"(emphasis added)). Another reasonable interpretation, however, is that the
references in the regulations to "value" for estate tax purposes and to "inclusion" in the
gross estate are merely shorthand for implementing the general statutory rule that the basis
for property received from a decedent be adjusted to its fair market value as of the date of
death. This interpretation comports with a literal reading of section 1014(a). Thus, it is
probably the better view.
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conservation easements, which was added by TRA 1997. 151 The
Department of Treasury has announced informally that it will take the
position that a section 2033A election does not prevent a basis adjustment
under section 1014. 152 Accordingly, under current law, an election to
exclude property under section 2033A apparently does not prevent a basis
step up under section 1014(a).
As observed earlier in this Article, encouraging productive behavior
by the recipients of wealth justifies an estate tax exclusion for closely held
businesses in which the recipients materially participate. Because the
post-death basis of property determines future income tax liability, basis
rules indirectly affect the value of the QFOB exclusion. Denying a
section 1014 basis adjustment for estates that take advantage of the
exclusion would penalize those estates by reducing the value of their
exclusions. If Congress wishes to reduce the value of the exclusion it
should do so directly by limiting the amount of the exclusion and should
not do so indirectly by denying a basis adjustment for those estates that
elect section 2033A treatment. Moreover, if property subject to the
exclusion did not receive a basis equal to fair market value at the
decedent's death, then the benefit of the exclusion would vary with the
basis of the business property: the exclusion would be more beneficial to
estates with high basis property than to estates with low basis property if
excluded assets received a carryover basis. A failure to grant a basis step
up to excluded property would thus distort the benefit of the exclusion on
a basis unrelated to its purpose. 153 Denying a section 1014 basis adjustment for QFOB interests would further disadvantage the recipients of
those interests by creating liquidity problems associated with the property

151

TRA 1997 § 508(b), 111 Stat. 860 (1997) (codified at I.R.C. § 1014(a)(4))
(denying the basis step up for such excluded property) .
152
See Treasury Official Clarifies Family-Owned Business Estate Tax Exclusion, Tax
Day(CCH) (Sept. 26, 1997)(reporting speech by Beth Kaufman, attorney-advisor with the
Department of Treasury' s Office of Legislative Counsel).
153
We do not mean to endorse the basis step up rule of section 1014(a) as a general
proposition. See Chason & Danforth, supra note 1, at 123-25. Rather, we mean that its
general application (whether or not proper) should remain with respect to any family-run
business exclusion, and that it would be improper for the benefit to be denied to QFOB
interests while granted to other assets owned by the decedent.
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having built-in capital gains. 154 Accordingly, Congress acted properly
when it chose not to modify section 1014 with respect to assets excluded
under section 2033A. To avoid any question about its intent, however,
Congress should make this result explicit through a technical amendment
to section 2033A.
Although there are arguments to the contrary, we fmd none persuasive. One argument in favor of the current system of adjusting the basis
of property at death is that the stepped-up basis is "paid for" by the estate
tax on the appreciation. 155 A logical corollary to this argument would be
to deny the basis step up if the appreciation is not subject to estate taxes.
The fallacy of this argument is that the premise is not applied consistently-the basis step up is not always "paid for" by estate taxes, because
the step up occurs even for those estates that pay no estate taxes due to the
section 2010 unified credit or the section 2056 estate tax marital
deduction. Denying a basis adjustment in the case of a section 2033A
election would create an unjustifiable inconsistency: smaller closely held
businesses (those whose estate tax burden is fully sheltered by the section
2010 unified credit) and those businesses passing at death to surviving
spouses would receive the benefit of the section 1014 basis adjustment,
while other business interests (those for which the section 2033A election
was made) would not.
Another argument in favor of denying a basis step up for section
2033A interests is based on an analogy to section 2032A. As noted
154

A rule requiring the recipients of QFOB interests to take the decedent's basis
would also introduce further complexity into a statute that is already intolerably complex.
For example, the decedent's basis would presumably need to be allocated among all of the
QFOB assets, notwithstanding that a portion of those assets did not qualify for the section
2033A exclusion due to the dollar limitation of section 2033A(a). To the extent that all of
the QFOB assets were not excluded under section 2033A(a), a portion of the assets would
likely be subject to estate taxes, which would necessitate a basis adjustment for the estate
taxes payable. See Chason & Danforth, supra note 1, at 124 & nn.121-23 (observing that
this adjustment is necessary to make the consequences of carryover basis consistent with
the tax results of selling appreciated property before death). Moreover, a carryover basis
rule would require that an adjustment to basis be made in the event that estate taxes are
recaptured under section 2033A(t). Cf infra note 157 (discussing the basis adjustment
rules in the event of recapture under section 2032A).
155
See Lawrence Zelenak, Taxing Gains at Death, 46 VAND. L. REV. 361, 364
(1993)(observing that this view is subject to logical inconsistencies and other problems).
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earlier, section 2033A is modeled to a significant degree on section
2032A. 156 Under section 1014(a)(3), if an estate makes a special use
election, the income tax basis for the property is determined by its value
under section 2032A. 157 One could argue, therefore, that there should
similarly be no basis adjustment for property excluded under section
2033A. This argument fails to take into account, however, an important
distinction between the two provisions. Section 2032A, unlike section
2033A, reflects the judgment of Congress that special use property should
be treated as having a value less than its fair market value, because of the
use to which the property was put during the deceased owner's lifetime
and because the heirs of the property commit to maintaining that use
during a significant post-mortem period. If the property is accurately
valued based on its qualified use, then there is no reason to give it an
income tax basis that is higher than that value. On the other hand, section
2033A reflects the judgment of Congress that the value represented by
closely held businesses should not be subject to estate taxes, not that those
businesses have less value than other assets. It would be unfair to
penalize such interests by imposing on them a basis less than their value,
when the same is not done for other assets of the estate.

I.

Summary

Section 2033A, in its present form, fails as a practical exclusion for
family-run businesses. Its liquidity tests extend the exclusion only to
illiquid estates, thereby denying the benefit to certain active businesses
that should qualify for the exclusion because they will be run by the heirs.
Its benefit decreases yearly as the applicable exclusion amount increases.
This lack of an ascertainable benefit makes it difficult for business owners
(and potential business owners) to ascertain the benefit of the exclusion.

156
157

See supra note 12 and accompanying text.

Under section 1016(c), if an additional estate tax is recaptured under section
2032A(c)(l) due to a disposition of the special use property or a cessation of its qualified
use, the qualified heir of the special use property may elect to adjust the basis of the
property to its fair market value as of the decedent's death. The cost of this adjustment is
that the qualified heir must pay interest on the estate taxes that were, in effect, deferred
during the period in which the special use election was in effect.
I.R.C.
§ 1016(c)(5)(8)(1994).
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Finally, section 2033A requires material participation before the
decedent's death, preventing abusive transactions but discouraging
potential investors in family-run businesses from relying on the exclusion.
Section 2033A does have some practical elements. It requires the
heirs of a family-run business to participate in the business. It reduces
complexity by not applying the exclusion to gifts. And, it does not distort
the benefit of the exclusion by requiring a carryover basis for excluded
assets. These features of present section 2033A should be retained in any
future version.

VI.

CONCLUSION AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM

Section 2033A, in its current state, is too complicated because of the
fifty-percent liquidity test. In addition, the liquidity test needlessly denies
the benefit of the exclusion to true family-run businesses. The problems
with section 2033A extend beyond its needless requirement that a
qualifying estate must be illiquid. For example, the benefit of the
exclusion decreases over time as the unified credit increases.
Even with its enormous complexity, however, section 2033A contains
the core elements of a practical exclusion for family-run businesses. It
grants an exclusion only for a trade or business. It requires the beneficiaries to participate in the trade or business after the decedent's death.
And, it reduces the value of the business to the extent the business holds
passive assets beyond needs for working capital.
By eliminating or modifying certain provisions and retaining others,
Congress could create a workable exclusion. Based upon the analysis in
this Article, we offer the following suggestions:
(1) Congress should eliminate the fifty-percent liquidity test. The

liquidity test is the most complicated part of the statute. Moreover, it too
narrowly restricts the benefits under section 2033A.
(2) Congress should eliminate the concentration-of-ownership test.
This test does not serve any meaningful goal of section 2033A, and its
retention would unfairly deny the exclusion to some family-run busi-
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nesses. Moreover, retaining the test would distort business owners'
decisions about how best to structure business ownership.
(3) The requirement that the business not be publicly traded may
distort the definition of a family-run business in certain cases, but
retaining this requirement is probably harmless. Indeed, the requirement
may be necessary to prevent abuse if section 2033A is liberalized.
(4) Congress should provide a fixed benefit that is indexed to
inflation. In its present form, the benefit under section 2033A depends
upon the size of the applicable exclusion amount. Because interests in a
family-run business represent unique assets, the exclusion should be in
addition to the applicable exclusion amount. Thus, a fixed amount
(perhaps $500,000 to $1,000,000) indexed to inflation would be
appropriate. Congress should amend section 2001(c)(2) so that the
benefit of the exclusion is not denied to large estates.
(5) Congress should amend the adjusted-value rule of section
2033A(d) to provide for a reduction in the amount of the exclusion only
for debt secured by QFOB property. This change would provide a brightline test for identifying debt that is properly attributable to the business,
and it would eliminate the disparate treatment of taxpayers who choose
different methods of fmancing business expansion.
(6) Congress should probably retain the pre-death material-participation requirement. The requirement distorts the expected benefit of the
exclusion by tying its availability to the timing of the decedent's death.
Nonetheless, the pre-death material-participation requirement is probably
necessary to prevent abusive transactions.
(7) Congress should retain the trade or business requirement, the
post-death material-participation test, and the exclusion for passive assets.
These three features sufficiently limit the section 2033A exclusion to true
businesses in which a successive generation will participate.
(8) Congress should retain the rule denying the QFOB exclusion to
lifetime transfers. Extending the exclusion to gifts would generate
inordinate complexity and associated costs for both taxpayers and the
government.
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(9) Congress should retain the section 1014(a) basis adjustment rule
for section 2033A property, but should modify section 2033A to make its
intent clear. Adjusting the basis for section 2033A property under section
1014(a) would ensure that the estate-tax benefits of section 2033A are not
undermined by any income-tax detriments.
To conclude, section 2033A in its present form is too complicated and
is unworkable. Most importantly, it needlessly requires that the estate be
illiquid before granting a benefit, and it provides a haphazard benefit that
depends upon the size of the applicable exclusion amount. Although
section 2033A has certain features that should be retained, Congress
should revisit section 2033A, simplify it, and improve it in the manner
suggested in the Article.

